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November 14, 1975 
STATEMENT OF SUZANNE SHEPPARD 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
R.R. 7216 
(A BILL TO AMEND AND EXTEND THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION 
ON THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES ACT OF 1965) 
Subcommittee on Select Education 
of the 
House Committee on Education and Labor 
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee: 
Thank you for inviting me to testify on H.R. 7216. I 
oppose the very principle of government art subsidies. ~y 
testimony will consist of two statements of my reasons for 
opposing these subsidies; the first is from my remarks at a 
hearing of the California State Legislature's Joint Committee 
on the Arts; the second is the argument I delivered at the trial 
of my suit against the California Arts Commission. These two 
statements will show that it is precisely because I am an artist 
that I oppose government subsidies for the arts. 
I. 
TESTIMONY BEFORE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE'S 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ARTS 
September 24, 1974 
I'm an artist, and I am here to speak in opposition to 
state support of the arts. 
Every individual has a right to think for himself - to 
express his own mind, to make his own choices and to act according 
to his own judgment. No one has a right to violate this right. 
I urge you to consider the injustice of state subsidies for 
the arts. Subsidies, as you know, require tax money. Taxation 
for the arts means: involuntary patronage of the arts. Every 
man has a right to choose for himself whether or not he wishes 
to support any form of art or any particular work of art. The 
state has no right to make these decisions for him. The state has 
no right to violate his freedom of choice. 
And I have no grounds to demand that the state tax anyone 
for my support. No one forced me to become an artist; no one 
should be forced to pay my way. If people don't like my work, 
or cannot afford it, they have a right not to buy it. But 
taxation for the arts vi.elates this right. A state has no right 
to make artistic choices for the individual; and no artist has 
reason to claim that his artistic freedom requires the denial 
of another man's freedom of choice. 
As legislators, you know that the state must account to the 
taxpayers for the way it spends their money. In order to justify 
its subsidies for the arts, the state must have reasons for the 
selections it makes. This means that the state is obliged to 
establish standards of artistic merit, and it cannot justifiably 
support an artist who does not satisfy its standards. When 
evaluating the merit of a work of art, the state has to consider 
the work's content. Its content ex.presses a theme or viewpoint. 
This means that the state grants official endorsement to the ideas 
expressed or implied in the art it subsidizes. 
This is crucial to bear in mind: A government with power 
enough to endorse ideas has power enough to silence them - and 
that is the essence of censorship. 
State support of the arts, then, is unjust - and it achieves 
the exact opposite of its alleged purpose: Instead of supporting 
the arts, it undermines the very foundation on which the arts 
depend: Freedom. 
When a man is forced to pay taxes for the arts, he is denied 
his right to act according to the judgment of his own mind. State 
support of the arts costs a man his liberty of conscience. 
This is an unspeakable price for anyone to pay. 
II. 
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT 
IN 
SUZANNE LEFRANC SHEPPARD v. CALIFORNIA ARTS COMMISSION 
May 20, 1975 
San Francisco, California 
(Please note: As the plaintiff in this case, I challenged the 
constitutionality of government art subsidies. For the record, 
the Court ruled, on August 27, 1975, that these subsidies are 




May it please the Court. The question I have brought before the 
Court is whether or not state support of art is within 
constitutional limits. I intend to show that by the very nature 
of art, its support by government will necessarily and unavoidably 
conflict with First Amendment guarantees. 
My argument is in three parts: First, I will demonstrate that 
when the state supports an artist's work, it thereby endorses 
his personal philosophy. In order to substantiate this point, 
I will show why an artist's personal philosophy is an integral 
and inseparable part of his work. Second, I will explain how 
the state's support of another artist impairs my own livelihood 
as an independent artist. Finally, I will support my contention 
that the terms of the "establishment" clause of the First 
Amendment apply to the arts and prohibit their support by 
government. 
I. 
When the state supports an artist's work, 
it thereby endorses his personal philosophy. 
I shall begin by observing a· self-evident fact: Every man is 
limited in the amount of work he can·a.ccOmplish in.his lifetim~. Thus, 
no artist can ever compose every possible combination of musical 
notes, nor paint everything there is to paint,· nor choreograph 
every conceivable expressive movement. If he is to create 
anything at all, he must limit the possibilities for each artistic 
work to a manageable number. The progress of his work is marked, 
therefore, by an on-going concern for what to include and what 
to omit. 
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Y.y point is this: To make the choices which satisfy his 
expressive intent, an artist has only one immediate source of 
guidance: His judgment of what is important; that is, his 
personal code' of values. Thus, with every decision he makes 
as to what to include and what to omit, an artist's work 
reflects his values and thereby expresses his view of what 
gives life meaning. In so doing, of course, an artist's work 
entails philosophical implications. 
It is no accident, therefore, that aesthetics is classified as 
a branch of philosophy. This classification simply reflects 
the fact that art belongs to the realm of me~'s struggle to 
find and express the meaning of human existence. But an artist's 
creation is not a philosophical treatise; it is not designed to 
evoke the cold blade of analytical reason. It is an impassioned 
statement whose persuasive power is addressed to men's emotions. 
Through his work, the artist says - in effect: "This is what 
life means to me. This is what is important." And whether 
he says this explicitly or implicitly, the artist expresses 
his personal convictions, not with the neutrality o.f a reporter, 
but with the assertiveness of an advocate. 
So it is that an artist's personal philosophy becomes the very 
soul of his work - the core of its meaning. And !!.Q. it is that 
when the state supports _fill artist, it thereby and ~avoidably 
endorses the artist's philosophy. 
In !!.2_ doing, the state commlts !!'.!.ill of ideological favoritism -
totally at odds with the spirit of this country. 
4 
TT J. .... •t 
ThP state's support of anothPr arti~t impai~s 
my own liv~lihoo1 as an independent arttst. 
My gove~nment's endoraemen~ nf another citizen's perso~a] 
philosophy relegates my standing as a ~itizen to se~o~d-class 
status - reqAa~ e~ouch ~o ohjict to state Rupport of the a~~R; 
8~fisttn oersonal nhilascp~v 
--~---""'---·-"'""""° "' -. ,. 
relegates mv 
ns a~ artist, I hqve Jit~~ally staked my rar~er nn my own 
philosophical convictio~s - for this reason: WhPn I offer my 
work for sale, it is my view of life which gives my work its 
meaning; and what my work means to a potential buyer will 
determine the degree of his interest in it. Thus, my personal 
philosophy constitutes the ultimate se~l;tng.:.E.£tD.1 of my work. 
Since my ph.i 1 osophy is the .~.£!!!..££ of my 1.i ve 1 ihood ~ any use 
of state power which effectively impugns my philosophy will 
thereby undermine my 1ivelihood. Tf the state oper.l.Y and 
'ti "tl . . f' J .i' i>h .• f , t ·+· exp~:h,I opposes my v-1 ew <L . Le• .; en 1 ,: orec..1. oses my oppor .;\PH ..Jes 
as a~ artist; l:f the state ).m.J?1.ic.i_!1..L disapproves of my V"1ew - whlch 
is the nase when it endorses another artist's work - then it 
threatens f.£!:!_cl_p~ of my opportunities. To one whose 
livelihood depends on 
its removal is damage 
1143 to threat alone. 
freedom of expression, the mere threat of 
enough~ But I am not subject under Chapter 
As I said in my complaint, at page 2 - quote: 
"Sa:id statute enables defendant to grant to selected artists 
the funds, influence and authority of the.State, thereby 
g.iving said artists an imrnedi.ate competitive advantage 
over plaintiff ••• In effect, said statute allows defendant 
to estab1ish a privileged class of artists, and compels 
plaintiff to bear - now and in the future - part of the 
costs of maintaining their competitive advantages over 
her." - Close quote. 
To that statement, I would add only the following: Where art is 
subsidized, it is not just artists who get the funds, influenre 
and authority of the state. Above all. it is their personal 
philosophies which are so preferentially endowed. 
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III. 
The terms of the "establishment" clause apply 
to the arts and prohibit their support by government. 
In defense of my rights, I wish now to offer points and authorities 
to substantiate the following point: that the "establishment" 
clause prohibits the government's support of the arts for the 
same reason and purpose that it prohibits government's support 
of religion. I shall demonstrate that governmental support of 
any personal creed, and not just of any religious creed, is 
constitutionally prohibited - and therefore, no artist's work, 
advancing as it does his particular philosophy, may be supported - and 
thereby endorsed - by government. 
There is substantial authority to support the conclusion that 
the term "religion" in the "establishment" clause embraces 
all personal views on the meaning of life - and not just religious 
versions of these views. 
First, I offer the following opinion from Flaska v. State 
(177 P2d 174, cited at page 237 by 16 Am Jur 2d) - quote: 
"The language of a constitution is not to be limited to 
the precise things considered therein, but it should 
embrace other things of the same general nature 
or class ••• " - Close quote. 
If this principle of construction be observed, then the scope 
of the "establishment" clause logically extends beyond religion 
to embrace the arts, which express personal views on the very 
same issue dealt with by religion: The meaning of life. 
Further support for construing the "establishment'' clause to 
embrace all personal phi.losophy may be found in the case of 
Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen (cited in 
!§_Am Jur 2d at page 235). In its opinion, the court said - quote: 
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"The meaning of constitutlonal guaranties never varies: 
it is the scope of their application which must expand 
or contract ••• some degree of elasticity thereby being 
ordered. not to the meaning. but to the application of 
constitutional principles." - Close quote. 
The application of the "establishment" clause is obviously 
directed toward governmental neutrality where the advancement. 
of personal belief is concerned. But clearly, the state's 
endorsement of an artist's philosophy is not an act of 
ideological neutrality. 
One may still ask, however: If the "establishment" clause 
embraces the arts, then why doesn't it mention them? 
Mr. Justice Jackson addressed himself directly to the intent 
behind the wording of the First Amendment; in his opinion in 
Douglas v. Jeanne.tte ( 63 S Ct at 888) he said - quote: 
"It may be asked why then does the First Amendment 
separately mention free exercise of religion? ••• It 
was to assure religious teaching as much freedom as 
secular discussion, rather than to assure it greater 
license, that led to its separate statement ••. " - Close quote. 
From Mr. Justice Jackson's observations on the "free exercise" 
clause, one may draw the following inference: The "establishment 0 
clause gives religion separate mention, not as a gesture of 
governmental hostility toward religion, but as a guarantee to 
all citizens of any persuasion that our government .!fil. ~ 
no Qosition whatsoever .2!! matters touching individual conscience. 
If this is the meaning of the "establishment" clause - and in 
logic and justice there can be no other - then .!h.! a.rts, which 
promulgate fil personal .Ehilosophies !l1. the-ir creators, .!!..~ 
consti tutionallv deni.ed K.Qvernmental support. 
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Conclusion 
At the beginning of my argument regarding the scope of the 
"establishment" clause, I contended that our government is 
prohibited from supporting the arts for the same reason and 
the same purpose that it is prohibited from supporting religion. 
My argument would not be complete if I neglected to stress 
that reason and purpose. I shall bring the whole point of 
my argument into sharp relief by offering three brief excerpts -
two from 36 ALR 3d 1256, and one from my complaint. 
In 36 ALR 3d 1256, at page 1260, the following comment is made 
about the "establishment" clause as it applies to religion - quote: 
"It has been suggested that the underlying rationale of 
the rule has been to prevent the use of public property 
in such a manner as to connote governmental sponsorship 
of religious beliefs, with the attending result that 
persons who do not share thes~ beliefs might feel that 
their own convictions were stigmati.zed or officially 
deemed less worthy than those awarded the appearance of 
official government endorsement." - Close quote. 
In my complaint, at page 4, I said - quote: 
"Said statute thereby grants to defendant the power 
to determine which ideas, as well as which artists, 
will or will not merit and receive the promotion, 
support - and therefore, the endorsement - of the State. 
In effect, said statute is the secular equivalent of the 
State's adoption of an official creed, to which plaintiff 
does not subscribe, but for which she is ·compelled to 
pay support." - Close quote. 
At page 1273 of 36 ALR 3d 1256. the following comment is made 
J.d .. 
about the case of Lowe v. Eugene__(]6 .~LW'1?.49) - quote: 
!'J 
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••• the court concluded, the government has no business 
placing its power, prestige, or property_at the disposal 
of private persons or groups either to aid or oppose 
any religion, and the majority, no matter how pure 
its intentions, has no right under our system of 
government to exert its political muscle to gain a 
preferred place for its testimony to its religious 
beliefs." - Close quote. 
It is evident that recent Court decisions have recognized how 
demeaning it is for government ~o require a citizen's involuntary 
support for the advancement of someone else's beliefs. Even 
greater, then, is the injustice, when such use of governmental 
power can impair that citizen's livelihood. 
Your Honor. According to 36 ALR 3d 1256, at page 1260, the 
Court's test of the "establishment" clause is whether or not 
there exists any governmental purpose to advance or inhibit 
religion. It is my contention - and the point of my argument -
that the test of ill "establishment" clause logically and justly 
embraces the guestion whether ~ not there exists any governmental 
purpose to advance or inhibi.t the arts. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee: 
Undoubtedly, you have been told by many witnesses that the 
arts will perish without government subsidies. If it be the 
survival of the arts (and artists) that you are truly concerned 
with, then leave them alone. 
So long as men are free - free to choose and express their 
own personal values - the arts will live. Involuntary patronage 
of the arts is an insidious enslavement of the individual to 
his government. If you approve the measure now under consideration, 
by endorsing an extension of the National Foundation for the Arts, 
you will effectively reject the principle of individualism which 
has distinguished this country from dictatorships everywhere. 
